Stingray: A Threat to Privacy in Law Enforcement"s Hands
THe technology is known by many names: most commonly Stingray and sometimes Kingfish, Triggerfish, or its generic title, the cell site simulator. The device is small enough to fit in a suitcase, roughly the size of a box of doughnuts, and acts like a cellphone tower to intercept phone signals.
It is also one of law enforcement’s most closely guarded secrets. In order to purchase it, officials must sign a nondisclosure agreement, which prevents them from saying virtually anything about the technology.
Stingray is a powerful new surveillance tool that tracks cellphones and has become popular with police departments across the United States. The device mimics a cell phone tower and forces all mobile phones within a few miles to connect to it. All phones connected to Stingray then report their numbers, GPS location, and all the numbers of outgoing calls and text. This information is subsequently logged without a warrant.
The biggest concern surrounding the Stingray is that local police may now have access to all of the data collected by any cell tower within range of their device without a subpoena to cellular companies. However, it appears as though Stingrays may be operating under a loophole in the Fourth Amendment because a warrant is only necessary when something is considered to be a search and no court has ruled as to whether the devices constitute one. Should the constitutionality of the device be challenged in court, it is likely that the Fourth Amendment issue will be one of many addressed.
The Supreme Court has been accepting more and more cases to help reconcile the Fourth Amendment with existing technology. In United States v. Jones (2012), the Court ruled a GPS tracker placed on a suspect’s car for four weeks constituted a search because the surveillance was long-term and the subsequent collection of data was a violation of Jonses’ reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet, Jones did not address whether electronic collection of data, such as the operation of the Stingray device, that does not physically intrude on a suspect can be considered a search.
The F.B.I claims that secrecy is necessary when it comes to the device, as any disclosure about the technology might allow criminals and terrorists to thwart it. One result of this policy is that many of the communities that have been urged to buy the technology do not necessarily know what they are purchasing or the potential privacy invasions they’re enabling. Consequently, the technology has become the most recent instance of a conflict between the public disclosure of government practice and law enforcement’s initiative to keep its methods confidential. While nondisclosure agreements are commonplace for technology companies, mandating this type of agreement with technology used by law enforcement has raised many questions about privacy and constitutional issues.
Groups like the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation are lobbying for statutes that require disclosure and transparency where cell site simulators are used. Eleven states have passed laws that require a warrant for the use of a Stingray. Even the courts are taking action in the form of suppressive motion hearings in states like Arizona and Florida. In Tallahassee, police offered a defendant a plea deal, rather than comply with a court order to reveal details of the technology.
But until any legislation is passed or a court makes a definitive ruling, the unchecked use of Stingray technology and lack of oversight poses a significant danger to the privacy of numerous citizens, the overwhelming majority of which do not even know the device exists.