WORLD WAR III (WWW 3) is on Middle East Front

By Prof Ghulam Mohyuddin wani

Introduction.

 Well dear readers and friends, having read my earlier article on the topic and your appreciation of it, here I am back with my research summary on Egyptian crisis. Here I have drawn my hypothesis on the following grounds. I must present the readers with an overview of all the partners involved in the conflict or those who be or would be effected by these change. I feel the players and actors involved are the populace of Egypt who are on the offensive you observe on the televisions of the world. Perhaps much is known to you. What people say and thick is almost crystal clear and all the journalists from India to Chile and from America to China are full of their rhetoric strikes and peaceful demonstration. The recent promise of Hosni Mubarak to leave or not to participate in election and declaring to decline in September,2011.His support groups in USA averse to him (see President Obama recent speech),HIS ARMY up in sleeves against him and openly supporting peaceful protest,Isreal confused and conspiring, Russians ,Chinese and rest of the world watching which way the wind belows.True with all Muslim autocracy in fear and Muslim brotherhood and peaceful Islamic world praying for the success of public outcry both in Tunisia and Egypt. The Iran, Pakistan, Turkey armed force getting spiritual and moral fuel from the Egyptian army. Under these circumstances my null hypothesis as an author is "Islamic revival and peace can be the end result "This can be true or false. If it is proved true the world ahead will be peaceful as most of the west and some Asian economies making the buck on Middle East resources may have change in mind set. If it is proved false then the world order of anarchy may increase and led to more destruction or even a nuclear holocaust can be an end of the crisis and resultant WWWW (World war 4) to be fought with number and sword game, which in my option is sure to be won by hardy forces of Islamists and not by the air-condition lovers soldiers of the west and east together. In order to reset on a conclusion I choose to investigate the following classing options of the world of intellectuals to support my thesis. They the views of David Newman , professor of political geography at Ben-Gurion University in Beersheba and editor of the International Journal of Geopolitics. These views have been expressed by him on Feb, 1, 2011.Here is his abstract There is a joke in Israel at the moment that goes like this: Israel is preparing itself for the first ever state visit of President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt. And because it has taken Mubarak so long – almost 30 years – to finally make the visit, he has decided to stay for an indefinite period. Israel would prefer that neighbours like Egypt, Jordan and Syria not be challenged by real democratic transformation, which would bring more radical groups to power. No doubt about it. Israel would prefer to spend the next 10 years complaining about Mubarak's refusal to visit Israel, the state of the "cold" peace and the lack of normalization, rather than to face a new government which could potentially be composed of groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, which may not be as favourably disposed toward maintaining the peace with Israel. The Mubarak regime maintained the peace not because of a love for Israel but because of the hard geopolitical and geo-economics realities; not least the massive amounts of foreign aid from the U.S. as a means of maintaining regional stability. Unlike the rest of the western world, Israel has not been offering platitudes about the need for democracy during the past week. On the contrary, there have been hints that Netanyahu and his government have been critical of the voices coming out of the U.S. and Britain which have been urging Mubarak to listen to the voices of his people and to heed the calls for governmental change and greater democracy. Israeli ministers have managed, quite miraculously for this opinionated country, to maintain a public silence over events in neighbouring Egypt, at the most voicing a diplomatic concern. But the truth is that Israel is worried about this turn of events and the possibility that the Mubarak dictatorship may eventually be replaced by a democratic government which is composed of more radical groups. Israel is less concerned about Tunisia than it is that Egypt might follow the path of Iran, and that the spread of grass roots democratization might also spill over to its other neighbours, like Jordan – with whom it maintains cold but normal relations – and Syria – with who it remains in conflict though there is no threat of a direct confrontation. Syria, in particular, is governed by a Mubarak-type ruler, Basher Assad, who maintains internal stability and ruthlessly represses any form of opposition, especially from Islamic and fundamentalist circles. And herein lays the great dilemma for Israel. The country perceives itself, and portrays itself internationally, as the only "true" democracy in the Middle East. It continually points out that its neighbours are ruled by authoritarian leaders who stamp out grass roots unrest and that only democracies can be trusted to maintain regional peace and stability and be partners in the fight against global terrorism and religious fundamentalism. But Israel is equally happy that these regimes – Egypt, Jordan and Syria – are ruled by people who have a cold geopolitical interest in maintaining the present regional balance, and would prefer that their hegemonic rule not be challenged by the real democratic transformation, which would bring more radical groups to power. In the long term Israel desires neighbouring regimes who will maintain the current status quo. And if that comes at a price of ignoring dissent and bottom-up democracy, so be it. From an internal perspective, long term security and avoidance of war is of greater importance, and a neighbour known (Mubarak) is better than one unknown (a democratic government) which may threaten this delicate balance. My second reach analysis is based on the article of DR Amjad Atallah, Director of the Middle East Task Force at New an American Foundation as available on February, and 2011.His views as reproduced as: "Many pundits in the United States and Israel have been concerned about the impact Egyptian democracy might have for Israel's policies in the region. In light of the terminal state of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, democracy – or at least the beginnings of representative government in Egypt – might just be what are needed to resurrect chances of an actual end of occupation. Representative government in Egypt may create the political conditions that would allow Israel to reconsider the benefits of the occupation. Al Jazeera and the Guardian's recent publications of Palestinian minutes of negotiations covering more than a decade have shown that, contrary to Western popular myths (and to the embarrassment of some Palestinians), the P.L.O. has repeatedly made enormous concessions on every permanent status issue to every Israeli prime minister but to no avail. They also show that no Palestinian leader, no matter how accommodating, could accept continued Israeli control over Palestine. Rather than lead to a de-occupation, the negotiations have only provided a cover for its entrenchment, despite the sincerest efforts of many Palestinian and American negotiators. This could all change with Egypt's potential transformation from autocracy to representative government. The U.S. and Israel can expect any new Egyptian government to respect the Camp David Accords as it afforded a real benefit to Egypt – the return to Egypt of the Sinai Peninsula from Israeli occupation. However, it is equally likely that no representative Egyptian leader will be able to continue the siege of the Gaza Strip, support efforts to keep the Palestinians divided or tolerate another Israeli attack on Gaza. Like Turkey, a representative government in Egypt would be likely to demand real freedom for Palestinians as a result of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and would place greater emphasis on Palestinian unity and human rights. In the short term this could spell trouble for Israeli-American attempts to drag Palestinians in Ramallah into so-called "unconditional" talks. But those talks were destined to fail anyway without a change in U.S. policy, and at great cost to American prestige and influence. In the medium term, representative government in Egypt may create the political conditions that would allow Israel to re-evaluate the benefits of continuing the occupation and not granting full political equality to those under its control. As U.S. influence in the region continues to recede, not least as a result of our deference to Israel over our own interests and political values, democratic regional forces may pick up the burden of working for a real end to the occupation while providing good governance to Egyptians and other Arabs – and that would be a win-win for everyone. The next set of materials of my thesis is review from the famous author of the "Imagining Border "David Makovsky, the Ziegler Distinguished Fellow and Director, Washington Institute for Near East .His views are sum married as. Although there are too many variables in the very fluid Egyptian upheaval to predict its consequences on the Israeli-Palestinian arena with any degree of certainty, there are two scenarios worth pondering. One requires progress to avoid radicalization, and the other will lead to an Israeli-Islamist confrontation. Scenario One: The transition in Egypt is headed by the newly appointed vice president and representative of the military, Gen. Omar Suleiman. General Suleiman and the military are credited for not firing on protesters and for adroitly managing Hosni Mubarak's exit. The military ensures a transition that brings in constructive forces of Egyptian civil society and perhaps plays a role as a last-ditch guarantor. Moreover, since General Suleiman is respected by Israelis and the Palestinians for being the Egyptian point-man on a myriad of issues ranging from peace to Hamas, this Suleiman period reduces jitters on all sides. Scenario Two: What starts as a Berlin revolution of 1989 morphs into a Tehran revolution of 1979? In this scenario, the Muslim Brotherhood no longer remains low-profile and seeks to dictate the course of events in Egypt. The Brotherhood eschews the no-violence rule it maintained amid pressure from the Egyptian security state. Hamas, which was formed as the Gaza branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, feels emboldened. The Palestinian Authority fears this scenario certainly no less than Israel. In this context, Egypt no longer seeks to interdict weapons coming from the Sinai to Gaza, but rather foments radicalism. Israeli military planners begin re-assessing prospects of a potential war, worrying about Islamic encirclement: Hezbollah from the north (Lebanon), Hamas from the west (Gaza) and the Muslim Brotherhood from the south (Sinai). The first scenario requires Israelis and Palestinians to make progress to avoid the very radicalization that emerges from pragmatists like Mahmud Abbes, the president of the Palestinian Authority, being discredited for a lack of results. The second scenario will mean hunkering down, and will invariably lead to an Israeli-Islamist confrontation. My other research data is from the brains of DRS Marwan Muasher, former Foreign Minister (2002-2004) and Dy prime Minister, of Jordon and PRESENT VICE-PRESIDENT of Carnegie Endowment for International peace .He the author of famous "Work entitled "The Arab Centre-the promise of moderation. His views are as. The crisis in Egypt will have major implications for the Arab world, but the peace process will not be significantly affected. While it's too early to tell at this stage what the shape of a future Egyptian government will take, it is safe to say that any of the potential new leaders will not break Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. Cairo's influence over the peace process has actually been waning over the last several years. Unlike many other Arab leaders, President Mubarak has enjoyed a solid working relationship with Prime Minister Netanyahu, but this hasn't moved the peace process forward. And it's important to note that before the protests erupted on the Egyptian streets, relations between Israel and Egypt were cold on a popular level. Cairo's influence over the peace process has actually been waning over the last several years. Egypt tried to broker an agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Hamas, but didn't succeed. So even with Egypt's engagement there have been no tangible breakthroughs in recent years. The key country to look toward in the Arab world on the peace process is not Egypt, but Saudi Arabia. Along with the United States, Saudi Arabia will be crucial for charting a new plan for getting to the endgame before it's too late. And this won't change with new leadership in Cairo. Egypt has undoubtedly played an important and leading role in pushing the peace process forward in the past, but there's not much of a peace process at the moment. With this in mind, colder relations between Egypt and Israel will not make a huge difference over the prospects for peace between Israelis and Palestinians in the short term. The thoughts of Prof Dr Shibley Telhami, a professor for Peace and development at the University of Maryland and a senior fellow at Brookilgs institution are as "No matter what the outcome of Egyptian uprising will be, Egypt has already changed and the regional equation has been altered. Egyptian foreign policy and Israeli-Egyptian relations will not be the same. Even if the prospect of war remains low, the military in Egypt will probably remain central, and the Israeli-Egyptian treaty will not immediately be threatened. All polls indicate pervasive Egyptian public anger with Israel that's bound to be partly reflected in policy. Israel's top priority is to protect its strategic relationship with the U.S. -- and to make sure it's on the right side of any new policy assessment. But here is a prediction: Benjamin Netanyahu will likely be seen by future Israelis as the prime minister who lost Egypt. Egypt has been such an anchor of the Israeli approach to regional security and peace negotiations since the Camp David Accords in 1978 that its role has been taken for granted — in part because successive Israeli governments have assumed that the Egyptian-American relationship and the U.S. foreign aid to Egypt, as well as the Mubarak regime's own interests, guaranteed Israeli-Egyptian relations would be stable no matter what happened on other fronts. Egypt's importance for Israel grew even more in recent months as Israel's historically important regional relationship with Turkey suffered and Netanyahu became increasingly dependent on Mubarak in his approach to Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Arab-Israeli negotiations. Now, even under the best of circumstances from Israel's point of view — elements of the military and Mubarak's regime stay in control but with reduced powers and with more deference to public opinion — the crisis in Egypt will be consequential for Israel's policy. The first change will probably be an Egyptian reluctance to isolate Hamas. The big immediate impact for Israel will not be on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Israel's top priority is always protecting the strategic relationship with the United States. When there is regional change of this magnitude that will affect the American approach to the region, Israel will try to make sure it is on the right side of the new assessment. There will be a battle of narratives about the causes of the Tunisia and Egyptian events and their consequences in Washington and that narrative will be one of the first battles — akin to the battle of interpreting the 9/11 attacks and what the United States needed to do about them. Israel will have a stake in that debate which is far greater than the immediate prospects of negotiations. No one will be rushing to make a deal with the Palestinians. Mubarak was one of Mahmoud Abbas's key allies and the Palestinian leader has already been reeling from the Al Jazeera-leaked documents from the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and from the general perception that he had failed to make progress in the negotiations or to secure a freeze on Israeli settlements. Without an agreement with Hamas, he is in an even more difficult position to deliver and sell an agreement given the inevitable compromises. The U.S. will undoubtedly have to re-assess its policies. Washington can exploit the uncertainty to put together a comprehensive plan that can refocus regional attention on diplomacy — but the risks of failure may be too much to handle. It can also sit back until things settle down but that may be seen as support for Israel and play into the hands of angry publics. It can pursue a policy less focused on immediate results and more on the sort of principles of foreign policy— human rights and international law — that inspired the hopes of many around the world in the first months of the Obama administration. But it is impossible to put any new initiative in place before deciding how to interpret the regional events and deciding how to deal with them. The views of Michele Dunne, Editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin are reproduced as "Egypt has become so preoccupied with its domestic affairs — potential succession after Mubarak's thirty-year rein, economic problems, and increasingly demands for political change — that it simply is not playing the kind of extensive regional role it once did. A new Egyptian leadership probably would be less cooperative with Israel in terms of restricting goods going into Gaza. Egypt did provide a channel of communication to the Palestinians at times when the United States would not speak to certain parties, first to Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and later to Hamas. But the effectiveness of Egyptian diplomacy has been declining for some time. While Mubarak was close to Arafat, he is less close to Mahmoud Abbas and does not serve as much as an outside adviser to him. Egyptian efforts to broker an agreement between Fatah and Hamas have not been successful. Much of this is not really Egypt's fault; the peace process is largely out of its hands at the moment. The current Israeli government is not interested in reaching an agreement with the Palestinians. And the Palestinians are so divided amongst themselves that it is very difficult for them to be flexible. And frankly the United States and Israel stand in the way of reaching a Fatah-Hamas agreement. If there is a major change in the Egyptian government, the main peace process issues to be concerned about are a change in Egypt's policy toward Gaza and its role in the Arab League. A new leadership probably would be more responsive to Egyptian public opinion and accordingly less cooperative with Israel in terms of restricting goods going into Gaza — although it will probably still restrict Palestinians coming out of Gaza into the Sinai because that is critical to Egyptian national security. A new government also might not be as cooperative with the United States in terms of managing the Arab League and the positions it takes on Arab-Israeli issues. Menachem Klein, a former adviser to the Barak government and a Geneva Initiative negotiator, is a professor of political science at Bar Ilan University in Ramat Gan, Israel. He is the author of "A Possible Peace between Israel and Palestine" and "The Shift: Israel-Palestine from Border Struggle to Ethnic Conflict." His views are as The events in Egypt have sent the Israeli establishment and society deeper into their mental bunker. Many people here are expressing both concern and relief. The best situation for Israel, given the Egypt uprisings, is one in which Israel rules the West Bank in cooperation with Abbas and contains Hamas in Gaza. They are concerned that an Islamist or some other anti-peace force will take over Egypt, which has been a strategic keystone for Israel in the region. The demonstrators in Egypt seem to dislike the relations between Hosni Mubarak's regime and Israel, and Israeli policy in the occupied Palestinian territory. Israelis are also feeling relieved about not making concessions to the Palestinian Authority. Their perception, right or wrong, is that Hamas, because of its strong showing in the 2006 elections, would take over the West Bank if Israel were to give the Palestinian Authority what it asks for in the negotiations. For Israel, having an Egypt controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood to the south, Hezbollah to the north, and Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank would be a nightmare. The best situation for Israel, given the uprisings in Egypt, is to continue the status quo in which Israel rules the West Bank in cooperation with Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, and contains Hamas in Gaza. The Palestinian Authority cannot see the situation in Egypt as a green light for negotiations. The gap between what Palestinian leaders said in the negotiating room and their public statements was well exposed in the documents leaked to Al Jazeera. Those documents also expose two other issues. First, they highlight a wide gap between what Mr. Abbas and his negotiators accepted and what their public wanted, in particular regarding the status of Temple Mount and on the 1948 refugees and their right to return. Second, the documents reveal the contradiction between Israel's settlement expansion and its rhetoric when it comes to finding peace. Gil Troy is professor of history at McGill University and a Shalom Hartman Research Fellow in Jerusalem. He says as "Egypt's uprising has already undermined most Israelis' sense of security and their willingness to take risks for peace with the Palestinians. Israelis now worry about the biggest risk they ever took for peace: the withdrawal from Sinai in 1982. Many Israelis wish they could support this popular move against Mubarak, but bitter experience has taught them to be sceptical. A radical Egypt downgrading or abrogating its peace treaty with Israel would top the litany of failed peace-making attempts and reinforce the argument of right-wing sceptics against trading land for peace with the Palestinians. Moreover, a hostile Egypt would reinforce the sense of betrayal so many Israelis have felt since 2000, as the failure of the Oslo peace process triggered a wave of Palestinian terror, the withdrawal from Lebanon boosted Hezbollah, and disengagement from Gaza brought Hamas to power. Israelis have longed for greater intimacy with the Egyptian people, always speaking of "peace with Egypt" not with Mubarak. Yet this "cold peace" has been government to government not people to people. Israelis have accepted the limits, given their alternatives. Mubarak's Egypt has served as an important counterweight to Ahmadinejad's Iran. The recent Wiki leaks documents suggested some of the benefits Israel enjoyed from its alliance with Mubarak, including diplomatic support, intelligence sharing and military cooperation. Most important have been decades of non-belligerency. With the loss of that sense of security on its southern border, Israelis will be much more reluctant to cede control of their eastern border to an independent Palestine. This week's hysterical headlines in the Israeli press about the potential loss of Egypt, the dip in Tel Aviv stocks, the debate about whether President Obama can be trusted to support American allies, all suggest that Israel's strategic doctrine is being hastily rewritten. The prospects of peace become even more unlikely if Egypt turns Islamist. Israel's safest border will suddenly look menacing. Hamas will look stronger in Gaza with an Islamist Egyptian regime not even pretending to try to stop the flow of arms. The Palestinian Authority in the West Bank will look like a less viable peace partner with fundamentalism ascendant, and any pro-peace or pro-Western Palestinians demonized as collaborators. Moreover, Israeli policymakers will feel caught, doubting Mahmoud Abbas as another unelected autocrat while fearing the popular Palestinian street more than ever. Israelis find themselves once again in dissonance with the international community. Many Israelis wish they could wholeheartedly support this popular move against an aging dictator. But the bitter experience of the last ten

years suggests that scepticism is in order. COMMON PUBLIC COMMENTS ON WEB ARE REPRODUCED AS SUCH AS FOLLOWS Howard B. Golden Northridge, CA February 2nd, 2011 1:11 am It is hard for me to imagine a peace ever in the region. Perhaps the US should offer some of its land (BLM land) for a new Israel (non-sectarian). It would be more likely to bring peace, save lives and a lot of US money. As far-fetched as this idea may seem, it recognizes reality. Let's give up on the fantasy of peace with Israel located in Palestine. Recommend by 6 Readers 75% reader of the public vote for the above views. So a ringing bell --- Jim Austin said on Feb. 22011 as "If the US would withdraw military and financial support for Israel today, there would be a peace treaty tomorrow! Additionally, as the President of Iran stated "If the Americans love the Jews so much, give them the State of Florida." Out of 8 persons surveyed 5(65%) voted for and 3(35%) VOTED AGAINST Florida resolution of Iran) LG from New Orleans, Louisiana said on the thesis materials published above as "When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to affect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed