The ongoing debt ceiling debate has created much debate in the media, Washington, the blogosphere, and elsewhere. But it has also highlighted one (and perhaps the only) thing I learned in law school: the lunacy of Constitutional Law. In this instance, it's how competing laws coupled with Constitutional provisions puts any President in a bind should the U.S. hit the debt ceiling. Here's why.

As we all know, Congress controls the purse strings, makes the laws, and blah, blah, blah:

Article I, Section. 8.

The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States

And the President must enforce those laws, which includes Congressionally authorized budgets:

[H]e shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed

Then came along the 14th Amendment, specifically sections 4 and 5, which state:

SECTION 4.

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

SECTION 5.

The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.

As a result, Congress has virtually complete control over spending, taxing, the debt ceiling, etc. This was affirmed in the 1970s when President Nixon attempted to "impound", or not expend funds, appropriated by Congress:

The 1974 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act created a set of institutional changes designed to help Congress regain power over the budget process. The Act was inspired by Richard Nixon's refusal to disburse nearly $12 billion of congressionally-appropriated funds in 1973-74 through the executive power of impoundment, as well as more generalized fears about the budget deficit. Nixon claimed that the deficit was causing high inflation and that as a result he needed to curb government spending.

So, in the present matter of the debt ceiling, should Congress not raise the debt ceiling, the President would still be obligated to spend funds as appropriated by Congress. However, as tax receipts only make up roughly 60% of the federal budget, decisions would have to be made on what to fund. One would assume that execution of the laws (Congressionally authorized budgets, for instance would be in the province of the President... but, the 1974 Budget and Impoundement Act strips the President of that authority (and yes, there is case precedence on the Constitutionality of the Act--Train v. City of New York, (in a lot of big legal words, the President cannot unilaterally decide whether to withhold funds appropriated by Congress)). Of course, neither the Act nor the SCOTUS holding deals with the issue of things like, looming fiscal crisis and how budget prioritization and debt ceiling matters get handled in an expeditious manner, and this is the legal and Constitutional framework we have to work with.

So with about a month left before the Treasury runs out of funds, who has the authority to prioritize the budget, provided they can get a plan hammered out and agreed to in the next, say, 4-5 weeks? Congress... we might be screwed.